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The Takeaway © Mosbacher Institute 
Although warfare is a pervasive geopolitical risk, its ef-
fects on firms’ day-to-day operations are poorly under-
stood. This article discusses recent evidence on how war 
influences firms’ operations and offers public policy in-
sights to address those effects. 
WARFARE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
With costs upwards of $14.4 trillion a year,1 war adds hefty 
costs to the global economy—including 98.3 billion in produc-
tion losses. This is a pricey bill, especially for the least devel-
oped economies, which suffer massive production losses and 
pay stifling security and risk-mitigation fees. While most war-
fare occurs in the developing world, its effects ripple across 
supply chains, shrinking production2 and jeopardizing the 
world’s supply of the metals, energy, and agricultural com-
modities produced in conflict zones. Today, with 169 con-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Warfare threatens supply chain 
stability by exposing war-zone 
firms to the inventory-
accumulation hazard. 
 
Policies should strive to spread 
the inventory-accumulation 
risk across the supply chain. 
 
Governments play critical roles 
in promoting supply chain 
stability and facilitating 
logistics in conflict zones. 
 
The study of firm-level 
operations during wartime is 
scant but necessary for 
strengthening policymaking.  
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flicts3 and more than two billion people af-
fected,4 policymaking is crucial for global 
production assurance. 
Clearly ending the war is a solution to the 
production stability issue; however, with an 
average war duration of 5.5 years,5 policy-
making is necessary to address the short- 
and intermediate-term war consequences. 
But first, policymakers need a full grasp of 
firms’ operations during warfare. On the 
battlefield, firms endure daily ordeals at the 
hands of fighters who attack firms’ facilities 
and workers, and frustrate operations and 
supply networks. Understanding this disrup-
tive context, including firms’ day-to-day op-
erations, would assist in designing policies 
that mitigate war’s crippling effects. In light 
of this, this article discusses recent evidence 
from our research on how war influences 
firms’ inventories,6 and offers some policy 
insights to address those ill effects. 
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND 
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
Companies keep inventories to meet cus-
tomers’ demand—healthy inventory levels 
translate into healthy supply chains. Inven-
tory is a firm’s must-have tool to cope with 
supply uncertainty and smooth day-to-day 
operations. The more inventories a firm has, 
the less operational risk the firm bears. 
Armed conflict, however, gives rise to a 
unique operational risk that alters inventory 
policies. During warfare, war actors (e.g., 
rebels) are strategic and prey on business 
inventories, putting firms’ valuable stock-
piles at risk. Rebels damage and steal pro-
ductive assets pursuing power, recognition, 
and provisions to survive. They will try to 
steal inventories from factories and ware-
houses, or snatch them while they are in 
transit. From the firms’ perspective, keeping 
inventories is dangerous, which can wreak 
havoc among inventory-intensive business-
es. This inventory-accumulation hazard 
strains a firm’s day-to-day operations, influ-
encing its inventory and production levels.  
THE EVIDENCE 
Our study employed data from 38,916 busi-
nesses in war-torn Colombia, and examined 
their inventories across conflict zones. Co-
lombia’s civil war is the longest-lasting con-
flict in the western hemisphere, and war has 
been fought mainly between the govern-
ment and the rebels of FARC (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN 
(National Liberation Army). We procured 
conflict data on violence perpetrated by 
these rebel groups and studied firms’ inven-
tory during the 2012-peace process between 
Colombia’s government and FARC.  
In 2012, after decades of failed peace negoti-
ations, FARC agreed to initiate a peace deal, 
which led years later to a final peace agree-
ment. The peace talks significantly de-
escalated the conflict in FARC-controlled 
regions, but they didn’t stop the conflict in 
ELN-dominated areas since the ELN wasn’t 
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part of the peace process. Thus, we were able 
to measure how firms adjusted their invento-
ries after the 2012-peace process. Specifically, 
we examined firms’ inventory levels in FARC 
regions and compared them with the invento-
ry levels of firms in ELN-controlled areas 
which continued suffering relentless violence.  
FINDINGS & PUBLIC POLICY INSIGHTS 
The study demonstrates a working-capital 
substitution effect: war leads firms to replace 
inventory with cash. Colombian firms in con-
flict zones lowered their inventory-to-assets 
ratio by 9%–12%, but increased their cash-to-
assets ratio by 7%–11%. War increases the 
cost of holding physical stock, making inven-
tory a relatively expensive form of working 
capital. While a firm’s cash is protected in the 
banks’ vaults, its inventories are exposed to 
civil war violence. The study also revealed a 
lean-inventory effect, showing that a firm’s 
inventory reduction occurs mainly in raw and 
work-in-process inventories. Inventories of 
finished goods are relatively insensitive to 
violence. 
Altogether, what this means is that firms 
strengthen their financial buffers but weaken 
their inventory buffers, especially of unpro-
cessed inventories, becoming unresponsive to 
unplanned or last-minute orders. This effect 
has detrimental consequences for global pro-
duction; it means that economic growth, sup-
ported by rapid production expansions and 
higher demands, is curbed by the inability of 
suppliers in war-torn regions to fulfill new 
orders. This inefficiency upsets a conflict 
country’s competitiveness, turning conflict 
country suppliers into global production bot-
tlenecks.  
It is clear for policymaking that dispensing 
cash to these strained businesses is not an 
effective strategy, but creating incentives to 
ease the inventory-accumulation hazard 
could help. If firms’ inventory risk exposure 
lessens, firms could keep larger inventory 
buffers to take in new customers, respond to 
last-minute orders, or negotiate larger sup-
ply contracts. So what can governments do 
to mitigate this risk?  
First, governments can promote supply 
chain contracts that lower the inventory 
risks across the supply chain. Certain supply 
chain contracts (i.e., pull contracts), pursu-
ing lean manufacturing ideas, make the sup-
ply chain rely on the inventories of supply 
chain partners in the upstream stages, such 
as commodity producers. These partners 
need to be ready for orders on the spot and 
hold large amounts of inventory to fulfill 
their contracts. Lowering the inventory risk 
implies moving away from such supply 
chain contracts where only a few partners 
hold large inventory volumes and bear high 
inventory risks, into supply contracts that 
spread firms' inventory levels along the sup-
ply chain. These contracts should allow 
downstream and upstream partners to de-
fine the replenishment strategy jointly and 
set mutually advantageous supply parame-
ters. Cooperation like this, however, re-
quires information-sharing across the chain 
and a planner that sets the game rules and 
ensures fair agreements. Firms might not do 
this on their own. War makes firms’ invento-
ry data sensitive, and coordination is limited 
given firms’ incentives to conduct business 
with the lowest inventory levels. This issue 
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mission. It can facilitate channels that speed, 
secure, and ease communication across the 
supply chain and oversee industry agree-
ments that even out the inventory risk. A 
second tactic involves direct logistics sup-
port. Governments can take a step forward 
and relieve war-afflicted supply chains by 
investing in large-scale transportation secu-
rity that protects cargo and reduces firms’ 
logistics costs. This strategy facilitates ship-
ment consolidation and secure transport, 
and is a feasible plan if supported by all the 
supply chain partners.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the bulk of research on civil war, 
few have studied plant-level operations dur-
ing wartime. As a result, we have only rough 
insights on the day-to-day operations in war
-torn regions. This poor understanding of 
how firms operate in war zones obstructs 
clear-cut and impactful policymaking. What 
we do know, however, is that armed con-
flicts are frequent, long-lasting, and costly. 
And now we know that, unlike other calami-
ties such as natural disasters, armed conflict 
gives rise to the inventory-accumulation 
hazard—leading firms to replace inventory 
with cash and hold suboptimal inventory 
levels, which affect supply chain and produc-
tion stability.  
This unwanted effect of armed conflict can 
be mitigated by promoting supply chain con-
tracts that spread the inventory holding re-
sponsibilities across the chain, and by imple-
menting shipment strategies that allow 
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